Key findings
The first post-quantum standards are final: FIPS 203 (ML-KEM) for key establishment, and FIPS 204 (ML-DSA) and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA) for digital signatures.
High confidenceHarvest-now, decrypt-later attacks make migration urgent for data with long confidentiality requirements, even though the timing of cryptographically relevant quantum computers is uncertain.
Moderate confidenceA cryptographic inventory is the essential first step, and most organisations do not have one.
High confidenceMuch of the migration will arrive through vendor updates, so vendor roadmaps and contract terms matter as much as internal engineering.
Moderate confidence
Context
Much of today's secure communication relies on public-key algorithms such as RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography. A sufficiently capable quantum computer could break them. Nobody can say with certainty when such a machine will exist, but the risk is already present for data that must remain confidential for many years, because encrypted traffic captured today could be decrypted later.
What we recommend
- Build an inventory of where public-key cryptography is used, including in vendor products and connected devices.
- Classify data by how long it must remain confidential, and prioritise systems that protect long-lived data.
- Ask critical vendors for their post-quantum roadmaps, and add crypto-agility requirements to new contracts.
- Pilot hybrid key exchange in a contained environment to learn about performance and compatibility.
- Assign an executive owner and review progress annually as standards and timelines evolve.
References
- National Institute of Standards and Technology. FIPS 203, Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard. August 2024.
- National Institute of Standards and Technology. FIPS 204, Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard. August 2024.
- National Institute of Standards and Technology. FIPS 205, Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard. August 2024.
- National Institute of Standards and Technology. NIST IR 8547 (initial public draft), Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards. November 2024.
- National Institute of Standards and Technology. Selection of HQC for standardisation. March 2025.
- US National Security Agency. Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0 (CNSA 2.0). September 2022.
How we reached these conclusions
This report draws on 6 published regulations, standards and frameworks, listed in the references, applied through Krynthnode analysis. Vendor claims are never counted as evidence on their own. Each finding is graded in the Krynthnode confidence ledger, described on our methodology page, and the whole report is due for review by 2 March 2027.